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COMMENTS
GASOLINE TAX-COMMERCE-STATE TAX ON GASOLINE USED IN INTERSTATE

An Idaho statute requires each dealer engaged in
COMMERCE.-[Federal]
the sale of motor fuels to pay a license tax of five cents per gallon on all
motor fuels sold and/or used by him in the state of Idaho.1 The term
"dealer" is defined to include anyone who imports motor fuel.2 A bill to
enjoin officers of the state from collecting the tax was brought by plaintiff, an interstate air carrier, which does not sell gasoline within the state,
but imports it for its own use in propelling its airplanes in interstate commerce. Held: Perpetual injunction granted. From the terms of the statute only a "dealer" who is engaged in the sale of motor fuel is subject
to the tax. Although plaintiff is a "dealer" within the meaning of the statute, it did not engage in the sale of motor fuels: Varney Air Lines, Inc.
v. Babcock, 1 F. Supp. 687 (S. D. Idaho 1932).
The court's conclusion that plaintiff was not included within the terms
of the statute seems quite correct. It is interesting to note that a subsequent section of the Idaho revised statutes requires every dealer in motor
fuels to render a monthly statement of the number of gallons of motor
fuels imported into the state, and sold and/or used by him during the
preceding calendar month. 3 The latter section is not limited to those dealers
who engage in the sale of motor fuels, but since the section contains no
taxing provision, it does not affect the instant case.
A further question of constitutionality in application to interstate air
carriers would arise if the statute were amended to omit the words "engaged in the sale of motor fuels," to interstate air carriers. By way of
dicta, the court in the instant case upheld the tax as a valid charge for the
use of air navigation facilities that the state furnishes. Prior to the decision
in Eastern Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission4 a tax
on the sale of gasoline destined to be used by airplanes engaged in interstate
commerce was considered valid as a reasonable charge for the privilege of
using municipal airports. 5 It is now unnecessary to sustain a sales tax as
a charge for facilities furnished. 6 However, since a state may exact a tax
from agencies of interstate commerce for the privilege of using public
highways,7 it would appear that the state may logically charge interstate
commerce agencies for the use of public airports. A tax on automobiles
1.
2.
3.
4.
6.

Idaho Code 1932, ch. 48, sec. 702.
Ibld, sec. 701.
Ibid, sec. 703.
285 U. S. 147, 52 S. Ct. 340 (1932).
Boeing Air Transport, Inc., v. Edelman 51 F. (2d)

130, D. C. Wyoming;

partially affirmed on other grounds, 61 F. (2d) 319 (C. C. A. 10th 1932);
comment 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 113; Opinion of Attorney General Michigan
1931, U. S. Av. Rep, 162 (Dec. 17, 1930).

6. Eastern Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, supra.

7.

Hendrik v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 S. Ct. 140 (1914).
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engaged in interstate commerce based upon their mileage within the state
has been held valid.8 It is submitted that the amount of tax levied on
interstate airplanes for the use of public airports may reasonably be assessed
on the basis of gasoline consumption within the state.
RAYMOND I. SUEKOFF.

The
INSURANcE-ExcEPTION CLAUSE-INCONTESTABILITY.-[Washington]
plaintiff insurance company sought in this action against the state insurance
commissioner an adjudication of its right to insert in its life insurance
policies the following exception:
"Except as hereinbelow provided, death resulting directly or indirectly, in
whole or in part, from being in or on any vehicle or mechanical device for
aerial navigation, or from falling therefrom or therewith, or while operating
or handling any such vehicle or device, is a risk not assumed under this
Policy, but in the event of death so occurring, the Company will pay the
reserve under this Policy and the Policy shall thereupon be terminated.
"Exception: This Policy covers the death of the Insured while riding as a
fare-paying passenger in a licensed passenger aeroplane or a licensed passenger dirigible owned and provided by an incorporated passenger carrier
for passenger service and while operated by a licensed passenger pilot on a
regular passenger schedule over a definitely established regular passenger
route of such carrier and between definitely established air ports."
In the insurance code there was a provision that all life policies "shall
be incontestable from two years from its date of issue, except for non-payment of its premiums, and except for violation of the conditions of the
policy relating to military or naval service in time of war." The insurance
commissioner refused to approve the aviation exclusion clause because of
its alleged repugnancy to the incontestable provision in the insurance code.
The Superior Court awarded the insurance company the relief which it
had asked. The commissioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Held: that
the insurance commissioner be restrained from interfering with the plaintiff's insertion of the aviation clause. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Fishback.1
This decision is in accord with the holding of the New York court in
2
In that case the rider in question
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway.
provided that "death as a result of service, travel or flight in any species
of aircraft, except as a fare-paying passenger, is a risk not assumed under
.Possible
conflict was suggested between that provision
this policy ......
and the insurance law which read into every policy an incontestable provision substantially the one in the instant case. Mr. Chief Justice Cardozo,
in holding that there was no conflict, pointed out the difference between "a
denial of coverage" and "a defense of invalidity":
"Provisions are not unusual that an insured entering the military or naval
service shall forfeit his insurance. A condition of that order is more than
a limitation of the risk. In the event of violation, the policy, at the election
of the insurer, is avoided altogether, and this though the death is unrelated
8.

Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245, 48 S. Ct.

230 (1927).
1.
ington.
2.

17 P.

(2d)

841.

Decided January 6,

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.

1933.

Beha, 226 App.

Supreme Court, WashDiv. 408,

235 N.

Y.

S.

501 (1929), affirmed In Metropolitan Life Ils. Co. v. Conway, 252 N. Y. 449,
169 N. E. 642 (1930).
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to the breach. No such result follows where there is a mere restriction as
to coverage.

The policy is still valid in respect of risks assumed."

See also Mack v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.3
This case was followed in American Home Foundation v. Canada Life
Assurance Co..4 and in Head v. New York Life Insurance Co. 5 (a federal
case in which the New York law was construed). It is the accepted New
York doctrine. Apparently the only case involving the exclusion clause for
air travel decided contrary to it is Bernier v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co.e3 The stipulation in the policy there involved was "it is hereby understood and agreed in the event of the death of the insured arising .
from engaging in aerial navigation, except while riding as a fare-paying
passenger in a licensed commercial aircraft provided by an incorporated
common carrier for passenger service, . . . the only liability under this
policy shall be for a sum equal to the premiums paid thereon, and the
policy shall thereupon be terminated." The airplane in which the insured
was killed did not satisfy these specifications. The insurance company,
maintaining that their liability was but for the amount of the premiums,
relied upon the Conway case. The Louisiana Supreme Court might in this
case have held for the insurance company and yet reconciled their decision
with the New York rule as expressed in the Conway case. The court, however, preferred to hold that "if the insurance company intended to except
also, from the incontestable clause, a violation of the conditions relating
to aerial navigation, that exception, like the exception relating to military
or naval service in time of war, should have been expressed." 7 In other
words, the court refused to read into the incontestability clause any exception which was not there expressed, nor did it specifically assert, as it might
well have done, that the aviation clause made any violation invalid rather
than merely that it excepted such a risk from the coverage.
These two cases apparently represent diverse attitudes towards the
nature of an incontestability clause. The present case, in following the
New York rule, has chosen the logic which seems the more convincing.
GEORGE
NEGLIGENCE-AIRCRAFT
THE FIELD-DUTY

TO

COLLISION

KEEP RUNWAYS

WITH

TRUCK

LEFT

W.

BALL.

UNATTENDED

CLEAR-CONTRIBUTORY

ON

NEGLIGENCE.-

[New York]
The plaintiff had his plane lined up with several others
in front of their hangars.
He stepped into the cockpit for the purpose of taxiing over to the gas tank. At this particular point, because of
adjacent planes, he was unable to observe the path he was to take down
the field. When he came onto the field, however, his vision was unobstructed. A glance to the right could have brought to his attention a truck
which had been left standing there by some workmen. The plaintiff testified that he took a "casual glance" down the field but saw nothing. While
taxiing down the runway, he collided with the truck and damaged his right
wing and propeller. This action is brought against the airport company to
recover compensation for injuries to his plane. The court applied the ordi3.
4.
6.
6.
7.

12 F (2d) 416 (1926).
1982 U. S. Av. Rep. 55.
48 F (2d) 517, 1930 U. S. Av. Rep. 235 (1980).
173 La. 1078, 189 So. 629 (1932).
Page 1079.
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nary rules of tort law to dispose of the case. It was admitted- -that the
defendant airport company was obliged to keep the runways unobstructed
and hence they were negligent. Recovery, however, was denied on .the
basis of the court's finding that the plaintiff had not exercised reasonable
care to see -that the course he was pursuing was not dangerous. Furthermore, it did not matter that he had the right of way, for he was still -bound
to use reasonable care to avoid a collision.1
The decision above digested may be commented, upon in four phases.
(1) Was the defendant airport company legally obligated to clear the
runways? (2) What would constitute contributory negligence in the present factual situation? (3) Who is to shoulder the burden of evidence, to
establish or. defeat the doctrine of contributory negligence? (4) What is
the effect of the mutual fault?
(1) The plaintiff was either a tenant or invitee of the airport company. If a tenant, the airport would owe a duty to keep the runways
clear; for "* * * the airport proprietor is liable for injuries resulting
to the tenants for defects in those portions of the field which the tenant
is expressly or impliedly permitted to use, and which are still under the
control of the proprietor."2 If the plaintiff were not a tenant (the facts
do not definitely indicate his status), then surely he can be placed in the
category of an invitee. The mutual interests of the parties is the test to
determine the existence of an invitee relation, as distinguished from a
mere licensee, where the plaintiff is on the field by permission but for his
-own benefit. 3 It is assumed .the aviator was invited to use the field, and
therefore the defendant -must.-use reasonable care -to render the premises
safe.4 An airport is not free from dangers. The invitor must circumvent. those dangers to the -same degree as would men of ordinary prudence
-in like .circumstances. 5 Where fairs -were held, .the courts have. assessed
damages ,up.on ,the sponsors thereof for injuries -to -spectators, because the
invitation to attend -implied an assertion, that the spectacle could be safely
witnessed.0
Inthe instant case, it!might be saidthe obstruction was occasioned by
some third party, a workman, .rather than the airport proprietor. Liability
would nevertheless be imp-osed .either on the theory of respondeat superior,
or for permitting a -dangerous situation to exist, if it is decided -that the
wo.rkman was an independent contractor.7 It -must be conceded that an
obstructed runway is dangerous. To pilots in -the present plaintiff's position, that is, to -those -,who are -still on the ground, the danger is ,minimized,
1. Read-v. New York City Ainport, Inc. et al., 'Municpal'Court of City of
N. Y., Borough of Queens, -6th Ditrtct, Aug. i29, '1932, 233 C. C. 'H. '520.
2. Logan, "The Liability of Airport Proprietors," 1 JOURNALOF Amt LAW
263 ('1930),.and cases cited.
3. Milauskia v. Terinnal R. Assn. of St. Louis, '286 'Ill. 547, 122 :N..E. 78
(1919) ; Grogan v. O'Keefe's Inc., 267 Mass. 189, 1.66 N. E. 721 (1.929).
4. Giannini v. Compodonico, 176 Cal. 548, 169 P. 80 (1917) ; 'lynn, v.
Central fy. of N. J., 142. N. Y. .439, 37 .N. E. 514 (,1894) ; Corbin V. Haws
Refractories Co., 277' Pa. St. '126; "120 A. '811 (1923).
5. Ibid.
6. Platt v. 'Erie Co. Agric. Soc., 164 App. Div. 99, 149 N. Y. S.,520 (1914)
Smith v. Cumberland Co. Agric. Sec., 1,63 N. C. 346, 79 S.. E. =632 (1913)

Richmond & Manchester Ry. Co. v. Moore's Adm'r.,- 94 Va. 93, 27 .S. E. 70
(1897).
7. Canney v. Rochester Agric.,Soc., 76 N. H. 6,03, 79 A. 517 (1911) ; Roper
v-. Tflster Co. Agric. Sec., 136 App. Div. '97, .120 N. 7. S.644 (1909-) ; Smith v.
Cumberland,.Co. Agric. Soc., supra; Richmond &.Manchester Ry. Co. v. Aloore's
Adm'r., .supra.
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but those who are in the air and are about to land are confronted with a
real danger.
(2) The municipal court, in the reported case, arrives at its rather
flexible decision in a somewhat cursory manner. Recovery is barred because the plaintiff did not exercise reasonable care for his own safety. Let
us proceed to some of the precedent in an attempt to illuminate the surface
expressions of the court.
Primarily, the plaintiff failed in his duty to keep a proper lookout.
The courts when dealing with automobile situations have universally required the driver to maintain a reasonably careful lookout for other
travelers and for dangers on the highway8 Failure to keep a proper look-.
out will amount to contributory negligence9 This duty to look fluctuates
with the character of the machine used and the locality and surroundings
in which it is being used. The judgment rests largely with the jury.10
Thus, the driver of a heavily loaded truck was required to maintain a
vigilant watch at all times.l Then again, when making a grade crossing,
a more careful observation in both directions is necessitated by reason of
the nature of steam locomotion.12 In fact, a standard of conduct has at
times been announced requiring the motorist to stop his car, then look and
listen before crossing railroad tracks. 13 During night driving the duty to
maintain a lookout is correlated with the duty to have proper lights. 4
Failure to have such lights will be negligence as a matter of law.'
6

5

Or

as expressed in Kelly v. Knabb,' the hitting of a parked car at night as
alleged in the declaration constitutes contributory negligence in itself. These
last two propositions really tend toward the rather extreme doctrine requiring an individual to "drive within the radius of his lights." Any accident
that does occur is concluded to be by reason of a violation of that principle.'? The application of the doctrine of driving within the radius of
one's lights does not reach the realities of night driving; it indicates, however, the extent to which courts will go in requiring a proper lookout.
Generally the courts have said the duty to look implies the duty to
see.18 "In its present state the law is not able to protect one who has
eyes and will not see, ears and will not hear."19 In Massachusetts, the
same tendency is expressed by the application of the doctrine of "negligent
looking." The court will review the circumstances, and if they find that
the accident occurred in broad daylight, that the plaintiff realized the
dangers and was proceeding at a low speed, and that there were no obstructions, they will presume that a reasonable look would have avoided
8. Cooper v. Agee, 222 Ala 334 132 S. 173 (1930) ; Williams v. Frederickson Exp. Lines, 198 N. C. 193, i51 A. E. 197 (1930).
9. Broman v. Kimball, 112 Kan. 186, 210 P. 191 (1922) ; Hunter v. Montfort, 117 Me. 555, 102 A. 975 (1918) ; Deal v. Snyder, 203 Mich. 273, 168 N. W.
973 (1918) ; Romp v. Osborne, 115 Ore. 672, 239 P. 112 (1925).
10. Dole v. Lublin, 112 Conn. 603, 153 A. 812 (1931) ; 'Williams v. Fredrickson Exp. Lines, supra; Graham v. Hagmann, 270 Ill. 252, 110 N. E. 337
(1915).
11. Campbell & Sons v. Central Rys. & Blec. Co., 160 Md. 647, 164 A.
552 (1931).
12. Graham v. Hagmann, supra; Baker v. Close, 204 N. Y. 92, 97 N. E.
501 (1912).
13. B. & 0. B. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66, 48 Sup. Ct. 24 (1927).
14. Steele v. Fuller, - Vt. -, 159 A. 666 (1932).
15. Haines v. Carroll, 126 Kan. 408, 267 P. 986 (1928).
16. 300 F. 256 (Dist. Ct., S. D. Fla., 1924).
17. Wilkins v. Bradford, 247 Mich. 157, 225 N. W. 609 (1929).
18. Sellon v. Tanner, 252 Mich. 231, 233 N. W. 224 (1930); Howell v.
Schultz, 182 Wis. 612, 197 N. W. 186 (1924).
19. Harrison v. B. R., 194 N. C. 656, 140 S. E. 598, 601 (1927).
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the injury. Therefore, even though the plaintiff claims to have kept a lookout, he is taken to have been negligent in that function.20 All the above
circumstances were part of the present case; could any alleged lookout be
considered reasonable?
The duty to keep a proper lookout is further complicated by the existence of collateral presumptions. It has been asserted that no man is
21
In other words a presumption
bound to assume the negligence of another.
arises that others will exercise ordinary care. In the instant case, this presumption would lead to the conclusion that no obstruction would be allowed
on the field, and as a consequence the necessity of keeping a lookout would be
diminished. In the motor vehicle cases, the driver is permitted to proceed
22
However, that does
on the assumption that the road is reasonably safe.
not absolve the driver from the duty to use reasonable care for his own
safety and therefore keep a lookout.23 A somewhat analogous situation
occurs where the plaintiff has a right of way by reason of a green light,
reaching an intersection first, or being on the right of an approaching
vehicle. It might more strongly be argued that the plaintiff can proceed
in reliance upon others observing his right of way. It has been universally
held, however, that the motorist is still required to observe due care to
24
This view is in accord with the pronounceprotect others from a collision.
ment in the present case. The policy underlying the utilization of the
formula is sound. The law above all should attempt to prevent injuries
from occurring rather than to grope doctrinarily for legal rights. It has
been said that an insistence upon a right of way in view of dangers to
others is the grossest kind of negligence.25
(3) A conflict of authorities may be noted when the courts determine who is to furnish the evidence of contributory negligence: the defendant to establish the plaintiff's breach of duty, or the plaintiff to free
himself from the implications of a want of reasonable care. The majority
of jurisdictions abide in the legal presumption against negligence. As a
consequence the burden is cast upon the defendant to show contributory
negligence. When confronted by a danger, the normal response would be
26
Contributory negligence is thought
in the direction of self-preservation.
of as an affirmative defense and therefore to be established by the defend27
This burden is fulfilled by a preponderance of evidence. Such a
ant.
20.

Pigeon v. Mass. N. B. St. By., 230 Mass. 392, 119 N. E 762 (1918)

Newton v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 273 Mass. 490, 174 N. E. 135 (1930).
21. Kaminski v. Fournier, 235 Mass. 51, 126 N. E. 279 (1920) ; Tischler
v. Steinholtz, 99 N. J. L. 149, 122 A. 880 (1923) ; Trentman v. Coa, 118 Ohio

(1918.

St. 247, 160 N. E. 715 (1928); Bew V. Daley, 260 Pa. St. 418, 103 A. 832
. Morgan Hill Paving Co. v. Fonville, 218 Ala. 566, 119 S. 610 (1928);
Kendall v. City of Des Moines, 183 Ia. 866, 167 N. W. 684 (1918) ; Raymond

v. Sauk Co., 167 Wis. 125, 166 N. W. 29 (1918).
23. Kendall v. City of Des Moines, supra.
24. Rose v. Campitello, 114 Conn. 637, 159 A. 887 (1932-green light)
Riddle v. Mansager, 254 Ill. Ap. 68 (1.929) ; Benson v. Tucker, 252 Mich. 385.

233 N. W. 354 (1930) ; Primock v. Goldenberg 161 Minn. 160, 200 N. W. 920
(1924) ; Webber v. Graves, 234 App. Div. 579, 55 N. Y. S. 726 (1932) ; Byrne
v. Schultz, 306 Pa. St. 427, 160 A. 125 (1932) ; Foley v. Taylor 121 Wash. 401,
209 P. 698 (1922-arriving at intersection first) ; Wallace v. JPapke, 201 Wis.
285, 229 N. W. 58 (1930).
25. Primock v. Goldenberg, supra.
26. Bradley v. Mo. Pao. By., 288 IF. 484 (C. C. A. 8, 1923).
27. Wabash By. v. Lamboy, 299 F. 124 (C. C. A. 8, 1924) ; Sopherstein
v. Bertels 178 Pa. St. 401, 35 A. 1000 (1896) ; Mo. K. & T. By. Co. of Tea. v.
Hogan, 89 Tex. 699, 32 S. W. 1035 (1895) ; Friedrick v. Boulton, 164 Wis. 526,
159 N. W. 803 (1916).
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preponderance may be gained from the evidence introduced by the.plaintiff. 28
The. minority on the other hand- view the absence of contributory negligence.as part of the cause of action. The defendant may. be. negligent
but he doesn't actually owe a duty to protect the plaintiff unless the latter
has himself exercised reasonable care. The plaintiff must then in the first
instance show he is free from contributory negligence.20

Statutes have been

enacted in several, of the minority jurisdictions, expressly requiring the
defendant to prove contributory negligence.30
(4) After evidence of negligence and contributory negligence has been
established it next becomes necessary to determine, the effect .of. such. evidence. According to the English rule, when. "the plaintiff, himself so. far.
contributes to the misfortune by- his own negligence or want- of ordinary
. . . care

. . . that but for. such negligence

.

.

on his part, the

misfortune, would not have happened," recovery is denied.31 This view hab
been substantially followed in the great majority, of American jurisdictions,
Mutual, fault eliminates the cause of action.82 This doctrine avoids, the
necessity of weighing different degrees of negligence and the apportioning
of damages. It serves to simplify the judicial, machinery. The opposite
legal pole utilizes the doctrine of comparative negligence, to give relative
weight to the negligence of both- parties. Most courts have considered.
contributoiry negligence an insufficient defense as against the defendant's
wilful and wanton or gross negligence.3 3 This rule is to be distinguished.
from the problem of comparative negligence where the judicial function
is concerned with the measuring of slightly varying degrees of negligence,
and then mitigating damages accordingly. The distinction is one of degree
and therefore difficult to maintain in close cases.
Various states have at times given voice to the doctrine of comparative
negligence only to repudiate or modify it later. In Kansas in the early
case of- Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Collins,3 4 comparative negligence was used.

In later cases the court renounced the use of the doctrine to measure
and set-off slight differences of negligence. They were willing to allow
28. Indianapolis 4 St. L. Ry. Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291 (1876),; Sopherstein v. Bertels, supra.
29. West Chi. St. Ry. Co. v. Lederman, 187 II1.. 463, 58 N. E. 367; (1900)-;
Segal v. Chi. City By. Co., 256 Ill. Ap. 569 (1930) ; Smith v. N. E. Cotton Yarn
Co., 225 Mass. 287, 114 N, E. 353 (1916) ; Vinton v. Plainfield Tp. 208, Mich;

179, 175 N. W. 403 (1919); Bulton v. Hudson River R. Co.,.18 N. Y. 248
(1858):: WendUll. v. N. Y. C. & H. 1. 1R. Co.. 91 N. Y. 420 (1883-infant required to show he exercised that degree -of care required' of him)-.
80. Indianapolis St. Rp. Co. V. Robinson, 157:Ind..232, 61 N. E-,197 (1901),
Indiana Act- 1889", p. 58; Dugaar v. Bay State St.
. Co., 230 Mass. 371, 119
N. E: 767' (1918). Mass. St., 1914, c. 553, Sec. 1; Horton -v. N. Y. C. R2., 231'
N. Y., 38, 142 N. E. 345 (1923), Civil Practice Act, 265; but cf. Potnick V. Lahigh" Valley R. Co., 256 N. Y. S. 232 235 Ao.
Div. 22. (1932-where the
court neglected the Practice Act; by' requiring, the plaintiff: to prove the absence
of contributory negligence).
31.. Tuff v. Warman, 5 C. B. .(N: "s.) 573, 585 (1858).
32. Sego v. So. Pac. Co 137 Cal. 405, 70 P. 279 (19'02) ; Lanfer'v. 'Minn.
& St:,P. & S. S. M. 12. Co., 209 Mich. 30.2, 176'N. W. 410 (1920) ; RushfordSurine"v. Grand; Trunk Ry. Co., 239. Mich. 19, 214 N. W. 168 (1927-unobstructed view) ; Monongahela City V. Fischer, 111 Pa. St 9, 2 A. 87' (188*6)
Goff V. Borough of' College'Hill, 259.Pa. St. 343, 142 A. 477 (1930');
33. Little V. Blue G oose Motor Coach Co., 346 111. 266, 178' N. E. 496
(1931)
Isaacson V. Boston W. & N. y. St. By. Co., 278 Mass. 37:8,. 1.0 N. B.
118 (1932) ; Simon, v. Detroit Unite'& Ry., 196 Mich.. 586, 162 N. W, 1012
(191 7,)'; Tomasik. vv.Lan'erman, 206 Wis. 94, 238,N. W. 85.7 (103.)... Contra
Sego,_v.. So. Pao:. Co., supra.
34. 5 Kan. 167 (1869)Y
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the plaintiff to maintain an action if his negligence was only trivial, while
85
the defendant's was gross.
In Illinois the court indulged in see-saw activities in its application of
36
the comparative negligence set-up. In Aurora Branch R. Co. v. Grimes,
contributory negligence barred recovery. However, the court departed. from
"The more gross
that' view, with the use of the following language:
the negligence manifested by defendarrt, the less degree of care will be
required of the plaintiff to enable him to recover. * * * The degrees of
negligence must be measured and considered and. wherever it shall appear
that the plaintiff's negligence is comparatively slight and that of defendant's gross, he shall not- be deprived of his action."37 This view was ap38
The doctrine was repudiated, however, and by the
proved in later cases.
39
now prevailing view contained in Macon v. I-olcomb, contributory negligence destroys the right to bring an action.
In Tennessee; the courts first used contributory negligence merely in
40
but they later modified the doctrine, effectuating
mitigation of damages,
a bar to recovery when the plaintiff contributed directly to the injury. But
if his contributory negligence was remote they retained it to mitigate
damages.41 This view seems only to tend toward confusion. In Mississippi,
a similar formula appears. Unless the plaintiff's contributory negligence
was the sole proximate cause of the accident it will only be used in
42
mitigation of damages.
The Georgia court adopts yet another variation. The plaintiff may
recover though guilty of contributory negligence. However, when he does
discover defendant's negligence he is bound to use reasonable care to avoid
4
the injury. 3
Many statutes have been enacted which adopt the theory of comparative negligence to apportion damages in certain types of cases, usually where
44
a railroad is involved, the running of trains, or suit by an employee
but
does
not
bar
recovery,
In admiralty cases, contributory negligence
5
The
only goes to a reduction of the amount of damages recoverable4
admiralty courts are allegedly competent to apply the theory of comparative
negligence, for not only are there no juries, but the proceedings are summary. 46 At common law with the "almighty" jury pervading the judicial
atmosphere, fine distinctions would only be muddled in the jury room by
personal judgments. So it has been said the common law has refused the
35. Han. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Peavey, 29 Kan. 169 (1883) ; Atcheson T. & S. F.

R. Co. v.

Henry, 57 Kan. 154, 45 P. 576 (1896) ; Mo. Pae. B2y. Co. v. Walters,
78 Ran. 39, 96 P. 346 (1908)--classification into degrees of negligence no longer

permitted).

36. 13 Ill.585 (1852).
37. Galena d C. 0. R. Co. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill.478 (1858).
38. Chi. B. & 0. R. Co. v. Warner, 123 Il. 38, 14 N. E. 206 (1887-requIring an instruction, that plaintiff exercise ordinary care).
39. 205 Ill.643, 69 N. E. 79' (1903).
40. Nash d C. 1. Co. v. Smith, 53 Tenn. 174 (1871).
41. By. Co. v. Hull, 88 Tenn. 33, 12 S. W. 419 (1889) ; BeJack v. Colby, 141
Tenn. 686, 214 S. W. 809 (1919).
42. Dent'v. ToWn of Mendenhall, 139 Miss. 271, 104 S 82 (1925).
43. Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Tribble, 112 Ga. 863, 38 S. E. 356 (1901).

Federal EmployersP Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A., P. 53; Corp. Gent.
44.
Laws of Fla. (1927), Sec. 7052; Laws of N. C., 1913, Ch. 6, Sec. 2; Genl. Code
of Ohio (1921), Sec. 9018 (discussed in Hiskett v. Pa. Co., 245 F. 326 (C. C.

A. 6, 1917)) ; Arkansas; Crawford and Moses Dig., Sec. 8575, Acts of Ark., 7919,
p. 143.
45. Max Morris "28 F. 881 (Circ: Ct., S. D. N. Y., 1886), AfM. 137 U. S. 1;
Carter v. Brown, 212 F. 393 (C. C. A. 5, 1914) ; The Apurimac, 7 F. (2d) 741
tDist. Ct., E. D. Va., 1925).
46. Max Morris, supra.

THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
doctrine' of comparative negligence because it possesses no scales to determine which wrongs weigh more. In the words of Strong, J., in Hel v.
47
Glanding,
"The reason why, in cases of mutual concurring negligence, neither
party can maintain an action against the other, is not that the wrong of
the one is set off against the wrong of the other, it is that the law cannot
measure how much the damages suffered is attributable to the plaintiff's
own fault. If he were allowed to recover it might be that he would obtain from the other party compensation for his own misconduct."
It seems to me that primarily underlying 'this rule is the public policy that
when there are two parties who have wronged, the court will leave them
48
to take care of themselves.
We are here dealing with a new situation; it is essential that the
proper rule be employed. The rules of law applicable to torts on land seem
appropriate. The collision occurred on land. Besides, the Uniform State
Law for Aeronautics, Section 6, would favor this application even in case
of. collisions between aircraft. The proof of negligence is normally a
nebulous undertaking, but in cases of aircraft collisions it becomes even
more difficult. One can quite agree with the result reached in the instant
case yet might wish to limit its application to accidents on the ground and
employ the theory of comparative negligence for collisions occurring in
mid-air. In those cases participants are usually dead, evidence of negligence
or contributory negligence is scarce, the rights of the parties could not
be accurately ascertained; comparative negligence would then divide the
damages equally.
The doctrine permitting an apportionment of damages would seem to
reach a more just result. Admittedly, both parties are at fault, but that
is no reason to let one go free and shift the entire burden upon the injured party. Legislators have seen the wisdom of an apportionment of
damages where employees were involved. Admiralty has accepted the doctrine as a part of its flexible proceeding. The adoption of all admiralty
proceedings in state courts would be very tenuous because of the varying
and unfamiliar rules of administration49 The incorporation of comparative
negligence into aeronautics law however, either as a principle of admiralty
law or as a former common law view, seems justified.
The extreme difficulties, that have been indicated above, in the use of
the negligence formula as a means of assessing liability in cases involving
aircraft, might be overcome or greatly relieved through compulsory airplane
5 0
insurance.
LEO
NEGLIGENCE-AIRCRAFT

FREEDMAN.

ACCIDENT-EFFECT OF VIOLATION OF AN ADMINIS-

REGULATION.-[Maryland]
In the recent case of Beall v. McLeod,'
plaintiff's husband, a passenger in defendant's plane, was killed when the
plane crashed from a height of two hundred feet, the accident allegedly
TRATIVE

47.
48.
49.
50.

42 Pa. St. 493, 499 (1862).
Button v. Hudson River R. Co., 18 N. Y. 248 (1858).
Hotchkiss, Aviation Law (1928), p. 34.
Ball, "Compulsory

Airplane Insurance,"
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(1933).
1. Superior Court of Baltimore City, Maryland, June 1, 1932.
cially reported. 1932 U. S. Av. R. 94.

Not offi-
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resulting from the unairworthy condition of defendant's plane. At the
time of the crash defendant was violating two Air Commerce regulations:
he was disregarding the terms of his Limited Commercial Pilot's License
by taking passengers for hire outside the limits of the area specified in the
license; he was carrying passengers in a plane which had not been licensed,
but only registered for identification. Several issues were raised in the
case, 2 but for present purposes the only problem to be considered is the
evidentiary significance of the violation of an administrative regulation.
The court instructed that "The violation of the rule . . . is not of itself
negligence, and before the plai'ntiff is entitled to recover he must establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation of the rule was the
proximate cause of the accident."
This question has arisen in but few air cases, none of which has gone
beyond the trial court on the point. In Herrick, Olsen et al v. Curtiss Fly8
ing Service and Byrnes it was charged that "the effect of a violation of
. . . these [administrative] rules is not of itself evidence of negligence
•.
A result of the violation of such . . . rules . . . is always a
question which the jury may take into consideration in determining whether
or not the violation was negligence, but, of course, the violation must
have been the proximate cause of the accident in order for you to take
4
then into consideration." In Zisen v. Colonial Western Airways, Inc., the
court instructed that "The effect of the violation of the New Jersey statute
and of any one of these rules is not negligence. . . . When rules are
adopted . . . the effect of them is to warn persons that it is dangerous
to operate aircraft other than in accordance with these rules. Therefore,
when an accident occurs . . . as the result of the violation of such statutes
and rules, it is always a question which the jury may take into consideration
as to whether or not their violation was not negligence; but of course . . .
the results of such violation must have been . . . the proximate cause of
the accident in order for you to take them into consideration."
The above quoted instructions do not represent the current doctrine
concerning the evidentiary weight of the violation of an administrative
regulation. That doctrine, as set forth in the leading case of Schumer v.
5
Caplen concedes that the violation of a regulation can never be negligence
per se, but it allows such a violation to be considered as some evidence of
6
negligence. In the instant case and its two companion cases the courts,
by importing principles of statutory use into the administartive field, have
laid the foundations for a legal tower of Babel. The effect of the viola7
tion of a statute or ordinance in a civil case may be negligence per se,
8
it may be only a prima facie case of negligence, or it may be merely some
2. Degree of care required of one carrying passengers for hire; assumption of risk by a passenger; burden of proof in an action for negligence.
3. Supreme Court Nassau County, New York, June 27, 1932. Not officially reported. 1932 V_. S. Av. R. 110.
4. State of New Jersey, Supreme Court of Essex County, April 10. 1931.
Not officially reported. 1932 U. S. Av. R. 110. For comment, see p. 285 of
this number.
5. 241 N. Y. 346, 150 N. E. 139 (1925).
6. Herrick, Olsen et al. v. Curtiss Flying Service and Byrnes, supra note
3; Hagymasi v. Western Airways, supra note 4.
7. Carroll Blake Construction Co. v. Boyle, 140 Tenn. 166, 203 S. W. 945
(1918); Propulonris v. Goebel Construction Co 279 Mo. 358, 213 S. W. 792
(1919) ; Partridge v. Eberstein, 225 Ill. App. 26& (1922).
8. Amberg v. Kenley 214 N. Y. 521, 108 N. E. 830 (1915) ; McElhinney
v. Knittle, 199 Ia. 278, 214 N. W. 586 (1925).

THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
evidence of negligence.9
the-injury.1O

The violation must be the proximate cause of

The statute or ordinance must have been intended for private

protection, as well as a public purpose,"' or more particularly, it must have
been intended to include within its scope the particular -object toward which
the duty violation occurred.12
The confused rulings in statute and ordinance cases should not be
allowed to cut down the operative scope of commission rules. Principles

of statutory application have no place in the administrative field, in-view
of the clear-cut distinction between regulations and statutes. The regulations concerning the objects within the scope of a commission's powers are
ordinarily a compact body of interrelated rules, designed to fill out the
details of a regulative pattern. Violation of such a rule is indicative of
remiss conduct toward the principal object of the group of rules, regardless of the immediate causal connection between the violation and a subseqeunt mishap.1S Although administrative regulations are by statute given
the force and effect of law, they do not fall within the category of legislation,14 and should not be interpreted as if they were legislative -enactments.
In the instant case this factor has seemingly been omitted from consideration. The result is a departure from the simple rule of Schurner v. Caplen,15
which represents the high point of judicial astuteness in recognizing the
distinction-between statutes and regulations, as well as the essentially differing-applications adapted toeach class.
The introducfion of the doctrine of proximate cause is an obnoxious
feature of the instant case. Proximate cause as used in cases of statutory
application such as the Blake case' 6 is a confusion of two questions which
should logically be separated: causal relation, and the intended scope of the
statute. For the reasons above pointed out, the intended scope of an administrative regulation should not be submitted to a jury; save under extraordinary circumstances it should not be made a question at all. Neither
should the causal connection between the violation and the accident be
made a prerequisite to consideration of the violation by a jury. The violation is some evidence of negligence, to be considered as any other evidence,
according -to the leading case on the subject. 1" The weight to -be given
-the violation is a jury question. It will undoubtedly be weighed according
to its direct or indirect relation to the' mishap, but the important point is
that the evidence is before the jury, not eliminated from consideration by
a perfunctory conclusion that it is not the "proximate cause."
It may be objected that the proximate cause doctrine is of value in
nullifying the defense of contributory negligence, where-the negligence al9. Davis v. Whiting, 201 Mass. 91, 87 N. E. 199 (1909) ; Flynt v. Rightmeyer et al., 177 N. Y. S. 842, 107 Mlisc. R 692 (1919).
10. Cherry v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 186 N. C. 263, 119 S. E. 361
(1923) ; Schmidt v. Wisconsin Sugar Co 175 Wis 613, 186 N. W. 222 (19,22).
11. 'Flynt v. -Bightmeyer, supra inote 9 ; Propulonria v. ,Goebel Construction Co., supra note 7.
.12. Davis V. Whiting, supra.note 9.
13. The, court in the Hagymasi case, supra note 4, recognized ,this -fact
in substance, when he charged that "When rules are adopted . . . ,the
effect of them is to warn persons that it is dangerous to operate aircraft
other than in accordance with these rules." Later portions of the Instructions
nullified the effect of the broad charge quoted.
14. Langellutig, "Criminal Violations of Regulations," 2. JOURNAL OF AIR
,LAW 151 (1931) ; U. S. v. Gririaud, 220 U. S. 506, 31 Sup. Ct. 480 (19.10)
U. S. v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 77, 12 Sup. Ct. 764 (1892).
15. Supra note 5.
16. Supra note 7.
17. Schumer v. Caplen, supra note 5.
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leged to be contributory consisted of the violation of a highly technical
regulation. Such an application would be of primary importance in collision cases in which each party violated regulations. There are two answers
to the objection. The first is based upon the doctrine of comparative :pegligence,18 the use of which is highly consistent with the principle contended
for. All violations of regulations might be considered as bearing upon
the question of culpability and damages, but the comparative weight of the
violations would be the principal consideration in settling the main issue:
who was the more negligent. The second answer to the objection is found
in the distinction drawn between the "planes of duty" in cases in which
each party has violated some statutory duty.1 This is a less desirable course
of action, since it contemplates the evaluation of some evidence by the court.
It also necessitates a distinction between rules governing the mechanics of
flying, and those dealing with purely administrative details, designed to
facilitate the efficient operation of the commission. Such a distinction is
practical under present administrative practice, although in some cases -the
classification would of necessity be arbitrary.
It has been suggested that the proximate cause doctrine might be used
to advantage in checking the civil effects of over-regulation. Technically
burdensome and prolix regulations might lose their severity when subjected
to the acid test of the layman's view of proximate cause. But -the same
effect may be gained by the use of either of the solutions mentioned, above,
without subjecting regulations to the ravages of a general use of a misleading doctrine. The commission itself might expressly limit :the civil
effect of certain regulations of the purely administrative type, and avoid
entirely the necessity of extending the protection sought.
The practical effect of the ruling in the instant case, supported by the
Ziser" case and the Curtiss case, is to rob commission regulations- of
much of their efficacy. Criminal proceedings in enforcement are necessarily
haphazard, and may conveniently be supplemented by the imposition of civil
liability.20 Such a result can be brought about by adherence to the doctrine of Schumer v. Caplen,21 admitting all violations ofregulations as some
evidence of .negligence.
Rolss'T -L. GROVER.
NEGLIGENCE-VIOLATION OF S.ATUTE-OvERLOADING-BURDEN

OF PROOF.-

[New Jersey] The defendant company was engaged in "hopping" trips
from -the Newark Airport over New York Bay, 'carrying, passengers for
'$5;00 -per headi in a -trimotor Ford 'transport plane. On the particular
'trip they overloaded the plane, 'carrying one more passenger than allowed
for a capacity load. Shortly-after 'the take-off, the left motor "quit" and
the center -motor, cut its revolutions to almost one-half. The- plane was
unable to maintain its altitude and crashed into a gondola freight car,
18. Emel v. Standard Oil Co., 117 Neb. 418, 220 N. W. 685 (1928);
Florida So. Ry. v. Hirsh 30 Fla. 1, 11 So. 506 (1892); Bibb Mfg. Co. v.
Williams, 36 Ga. App. 60e, 137 S. E. 636 (1927) ; Note, 14 Ia. Law Rev. .107
(1928) ; Note, 17 Va. Law Rev. 308 (.1931).
19. Bourne v. Whitman, 209 Mass. 155. 95 N. E. 404 (1911) ; Moran v.
Dickinson, 204 Mass. 559, 90 N. E. 1150 (1910).
20. The writer of a comment in 13 St. Louis Law Rev. '89 (1927)
rposes this remedy to support the efficiency of municipal: ordinances, violations
of which were not accompanied by civil liability .in the jurisdiction. of whlch

he wrote.
21.

Supra note 5.
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with the accompanying disastrous result of the death of fourteen of the
occupants, the pilot alone remaining uninjured. In an action brought by
the administrators, ad prosequendurm, of the deceased to recover damages
for death by wrongful act, the court held that the defendants were liable
(1) the pilot was poorly
for negligence as a common carrier because:
acquainted with the locale and the terrain; (2) the pilot had failed to
observe a ground rule; (3) the company had overloaded the plane beyond
its originally designed seating capacity. Ziser v. Colonial Western Airways,
Inc., 162 A. 591 (1932).
Under the general topic of negligence several questions arise, one of
which has a double aspect which requires some discussion and consideration.
That is: what is the status, as regards negligence, of an air transport
company when it has violated, first, a state statute regulating intrastate
flying, and second, the regulations of the airport defined by the airways
commission of the state?
At the time of the accident, a statute of New Jerseyl was in force
and effect which incorporated, by reference, the rules of the Department
of Commerce of the United States in regard to interstate aviation and
aircraft, applying them to intrastate flying. The two rules in question in
the case were:
(1) the provision that the license of aircraft shall be
suspended or revoked for operation in excess of the originally designed
seating capacity; (2) that a "licensed pilot, authorized to transport passengers for hire, shall not do so in a type of plane which he has not previously operated within the last ninety days for at least two hours
The first aspect of the question of the violation of the statute by the
defendant company is whether a private right of action arises out of a public wrong. The decisions of the courts in the several jurisdictions are
manifestly in conflict on this question. That the legislature has the right
to extend or create duties by statute which did not exist at common law
is unquestionable.2 And where civil liability is expressly imposed by the
statute for a criminal violation of its provisions, there is no doubt that
such liability exists. The nature of the action, however, in such a case
8
Where civil
is purely statutory and there can be no question of negligence.
liability is not provided for in the terms of the statute, the courts have
taken four views in this interpretation of the statute's effect. The majority
of the jurisdictions of the United States is committed to the view that
even where the statute is penal in character, a violation of it gives rise to a
common law action for negligence, consisting in either the breach of the
statutory duty and/or the failure to anticipate the injurious consequences
which are the probable result of the overt act and/or the omission to fulfill
the statutory obligation. That is to say, that the weight of authority holds
the breach of a statutory duty is negligence per se and, if the other elements of actionable negligence, such as proximate cause, etc., are present,
the action will lie in favor of the person within the class protected by the
1. Laws New Jersey, 190 See. 7, 1931 U. S. Av.
2. Racine v. Morris, 201 N. Y. 240, 94 N. E.
Skilton, 83 Conn. 503, 77 At. 550 (1910).
3. Jonesboro R. Co. v. Kirksey, 134 Ark. 605,
Collet v. Standard Ot Go., 186 Ky. 142, 261 S. W.
Bazar, 47 R. I. 221, 132 A. 384 (1926).

R. 405.
864 (1911); Sharkey v.
204 S. W. 208 (1918)
362 (1920); Wojtyna V.
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enactment.4 This doctrine that the violation of a penal statute is negligence
per se is also the rule in the Federal Courts. 5 A respectable number of
the other courts, however, have taken the second view. They refuse to
follow the interpretation of the above rule and hold that the violation of a
penal statute only raises a prima facie presumption of negligence.8 Still
other jurisdictions have taken a third view, holding that the violation of a
criminal statute is "some evidence of negligence." The courts of these
jurisdictions have based their decisions on the theory that the ordinary prudent man, who in his fictionized person is presumed to know the law, would
realize that the legislature had denominated such conduct as dangerous.?
In one jurisdiction, namely Kentucky, still a fourth view is taken. This is
the extremely strict view that in the absence of an express provision for
civil liability, the statute does not apply to civil actions and cannot be considered at all in the matter of a common law action for negligence.8
The instant case was decided on the ground that such a violation is
only "some evidence of negligence." the court giving the following instructions, which were upheld on review: "the effect of the violation . .
is not negligence . . . that when . . . rules, such as these, are
adopted, the effect is to cause the person to foresee that it is dangerous to
operate other than in accordance with these rules . . . . Therefore
when an accident occurs-and note this point-as a result of the violation
. . . it is always a question which the jury may take into consideration
as to whether or not the violation was negligence." This is a compromise
midway between the Kentucky view that the statute was passed atio intuitu
and therefore does not relate to civil matters and the view of the greater
weight of authority that such a violation is negligence per se in a civil
action. The New Jersey court in an earlier case, while commenting on
Dean Thayer's, Public Wrong and Private Action,9 says ". . . the reason
why no civil action can be based on violation of the statute is because no
right of action was given by the legislature in the statute . . . the statute seeks only to eliminate the source of danger to the public by imposing
a penalty . . . the legislature could, if it so intended, have provided
that anyone injured by the violation might have a private right of action
.. the plaintiff must recover on the theory of common law negligence.'10 This has been the consistent view of the New Jersey courts,"
meanwhile, and continues in the principal case. It is submitted that the
4. Tarrance v. Chapman, 196 Ala. 88, 71 So. 707 (1916)
Murphy v.
Adams 99 Conn. 632, 122 A. 398 (1923); Presto-Lite Co. v. Skeel, 182 Ind.
593 166 N. E. 365 (1914); Parman v. Lehman 119 Ran. 323, 244 P. 227
(1926) ; Hillstrom v. Mornkimer 146 Minn. 202, 116 N. W. 881 (1920) ; Kelley
v. Anderson, 15 S. D. 107, 87
. W. 579 (1901); Tenn. Cent. R?. Co. v. Page,
153 Tenn. 184, 282 S. W. 376 (1926) ; Smith v. Taylor Button Co., 179 Wis.
232, 190 N. W. 999 (1922).
5.
St. L. I. M. & S. R?. v. Neal, Adm., 210 U. S. 281, 28 Sup. Ct. 616
(1909).
6. Ward V. Meredith 220 Ill. 66, 77 N. E. 119 (1906) ; Martin v. Herzog,
228 N. Y. 164, 126 N. f. 814 (1920-but note that the legislature had pro-

vided that the violation would raise the presumption) ;Hubbard v.Bartholomew,
168 Ia. 58, 144 N. W. 13 (1913).
7. Pollock v. Ham, 177 Ark. 348, 6 S. W. (2d) 541 (1928); Rule v.
Clark Transfer Co., 102 Neb. 4 165 N. W. 883 (1917) ; Stehle v. Jaeger Co.,
220 Pa. 617, 69 A. 1116 (19085; Eames v. Caplin, 252 Mass. 205, 147 N. E.
582 (1925).
8. Ford v. Paduca 1R.,124 Ky. 488, 99 S. W. 255 (1907); Pritchard v.
Collins, 228 Ky. 635, 15 S. W. (2d) 497 (1929).
9. Selected Essays on the Law of Torts,
10. Evers v. Davis, 86 N. J. L. 196, 201. 90 A. 677 (1914).
11. Kalankiewiz v. Burke, 91 N. J. L. 567, 103 A. 249 (1918).
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courts' strict interpretation of the legislative intent is the proper one. No
more should be attributed to.a statute, which does not have the fault of.
ambiguity, than what appears on its face. But the courts' difficulty eventually arises at the point where it speaks of the effect of the statute as
causing theactor to "foresee.that it is dangerous to operate other :than inaccordance with these rules." Is it not a non-sequitur for the court to say
"that: the jury may take this into consideration"? It would seem that the
court then. is substituting the opinion of the jury for that of the legislature.
This: is. the hurdle which the.above view fails to clear. It is submitted that;
if the court-were to make the distinction that the jury-may use this in its
deliberations because it is only applying the expressed intent of the legislature in a .criminal proceeding as, a yardstick for measuring activity in a
civil, proceeding,. it would avoid the inconsistency of its position.
The court further charged that the violation of the ground rule, which
provided that the first turn after the take-off should be to the left, was some
evidence of negligence. This instruction would be followed even in those
12
jurisdictions which hold that the violation of a statute is negligence per se.
The holding is.based on the theory that regulations do not have the formality
and definiteness of a statute. Indeed, some jurisdictions have made a distinction between a statute and a municipal ordinance, holding that the
violation of the former may be negligence per se but the violation of the
latter can only be evidence of negligence."3
The second aspect of the violation of the statute is "whether a statute,
which. has previously been termed. unconstitutional, can be evidence of negligence." In a recent nisi prius decision,' 4 a New Jersey Court held that
this statute, which had been reenacted in 1931, was unconstitutional on the
grounds that by (1) the incorporation of standards of another sovereignty;
and (2) the delegation of authority to a commission to set the standard
of activity, the legislature had failed. to set up a sufficiently definite standard.'5 It is submitted that, in view of these courts.holding such- statutes
unconstitutional, the violation of the same court not, under any circumstances (in so far as the objection of the courts to these statutes has been
that "they set up too vague and uncertain a standard") be admitted as evidence of negligence.
Considering the Ziser case in the light of the future it may be said
that.the court has laid down a sane rationale of the rules of negligence to
be followed in. considering that class of cases which is bound to arise more
and' more frequently with the subsequent growth and effective development
of the airplane: as a means of transporting traffic.
G. W. K SNYDER.
DIGESTS
OF VERDICT.-[New Jersey] The
case-of Boele, Administratrix.v. Colonial Western Airways, decided by the
New Jersey Supreme Court. 158 A. 440, 1932.U. S. Av. R. 51, was affirmed.
DAMAGES-WRONGFUL DEATh1I-AMOUNT

12. Schumer v. Caplin; 241 N. Y. 346 150 N. E. 139 (1926)13. Rotter. V. Detroit R., 205 Mich.
12 171 N. W. 514 (1919).
14. State v. Larson, 10 N. J. Misc. 284 (193'2).
15. Ex parte Burke, 190 Cal. 326, 212 P. 193 (1923); In Re Opinion of
Justices. 230 Mass. 606, 133 N. E. 453 (1921"); Liberty Highboy Co. v. Mich.
Public Utilities, 294 Fed. 703 (Dist. Ct. E. D. Mich. S. D., 1923).
But. -see

Schumer v. Caplin, cit. note 12, where the court did not'expressly hold on the
constitutionality of the statute but intimated that it

would be so, and held

that the violation of a regulation was some evidence of negligence.
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by the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, January 31, 1933. 233
C. C. H. 3019.
For a digest, stating the facts of the case, see 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
118.
F. D. F.
GASOLINE TAX-STORING AND DISTRIBUTING-ULTIMATE
STATE COMMERCE.--[U. S. Supreme Ct.]
The case of The

USE

IN

INTER-

Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, April 29, 1932, was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court,
February 6, 1933. 233 C. C. H. 3055.

For a digest stating the facts of the case, see 3
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468.
F. D. F.
INSURANCE-

PARTICIPATION

IN

AERONAUTICS -DOUBLE

INDEMNITY.-

[Federal] Suit was brought to recover double indemnity on three policies
of insurance each of which policies contained provisions that the double
indemnity benefit should not be payable if the death of the insured resulted
"directly or indirectly, wholly or partly ..
. from participation in aeronautic . . . operations." Insured was president of an airplane company.
At the time of his death he was riding as passenger in one of his own
planes, paying the company for the gasoline and oil and the services of
the pilot, as would any ordinary passenger: Held: insured was participating in aeronautic operations within the meaning of the clause. First National Bank of Chattanooga v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 F. (2d)
681. Decided January 17th, 1933, C. C. A. 6th Cir. Tenn.
This case merely adds one more authority to the impressive law which
has gathered about the distinction between "engaging" and "participating"
in aeronautics. The highly artificial basis for this distinction was pointed

out in a comment in 3
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311.
GEORGE

INSURANcE-ENGAGING

IN AERONAUTICs-DOUBLE

W.

BALL.

INDEMNITY.-[Federal]

Plaintiff sued in equity as the beneficiary named in two accident insurance
policies, to compel the defendant to pay to itself as trustee for the plaintiff's use $60,000. Insured was killed while riding as a passenger in an
airplane. Each of the policies in litigation here contained provisions that
if the insured lost his life "from- engaging, as a passenger or otherwise,
in submarine or aeronautic operations" double indemnity would not be paid.
The court decided that the phrase "as a passenger or otherwise" could
not well be disregarded and that its effect was to take this case out of that
group of cases in which "engaged" has been defined to imply some active
operation of the airplane. Goldsmith v. New York Life Ins. Co., 233 C.
C. H. 3003. Decided December 8th, 1932, U. S. Dist. Ct., Eastern Dist.
of Mo.
The implication from the language used in this policy that a passenger
may engage in aeronautic operations and the acquiescence by the court to
the use of that language would seem rather to deny the validity of those
innumerable decisions which hold that a passenger may "participate" but
certainly may not "engage" in aeronautic operations. The use by the insurance company of the word "engage" in this case clearly demonstrates
that the carriers themselves had no idea of this distinction when these
policies were written. Courts. however, have attributed to insurance companies a subtlety in the use of language which apparently they have not
possessed.
GEORGE W.

BALL.

NEGLIGENCE-COMMON CARRIER-UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT.- [Illinois]
The
case of McCusker v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc., 1932 U. S. Av. R.
100 (Circ. Ct. Cook County) was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court,
1st Department, February 21, 1933. 233 C. C. H. 3022.
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For a digest, stating the facts of the case, see 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
120.
F. D. F.
NEGLIGENCE-AIRPLANE ACcIDENT-INFERIOR GASOLINE-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AVOIDED-FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF CAUSE OF ACTION.-[Ten-

nessee] The plaintiff's husband took passage with the Southern Flyers, Inc.,
for a trip from Chattanooga to Florida. The plane was equipped with
gasoline furnished by the defendant oil company, with full knowledge of its
intended use in an airplane. In the course of the flight the motors refused
to respond to the pilot's urging, and the aircraft fell suddenly to the ground,
thereby causing the death of plaintiff's husband. The accident, it is now
discovered, was occasioned by an inferior quality of gasoline. The defendants were aware of this situation and, to avoid possible liability, compelled their employees to remain silent as to the inferior quality of the
gasoline under threat of losing their employment. These facts were discovered only two months before this action (for damages for wrongful
death) was brought and over two years after the death occurred. A one
year statute of limitations controls these actions in Tennessee. The plaintiff would circumvent the effect of the statutory limitation by averring that
defendants fraudulently concealed the causes of action. A demurrer to the
declaration was sustained in the trial court and the suit dismissed. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, the judgment was affirmed on the ground that
defendants had not fraudulently concealed the plaintiff's cause of action,
(1) there was no contractual or confidential relation between the
since:
parties which would impose a legal or equitable obligation to make a disclosure. (2) Mere silence of itself does not constitute fraud; (a) there
must be a withholding of information asked for, or (b) the use of some
trick or device to intentionally avoid suspicion. (3) There was an insufficient showing of facts to warrant the conclusion that an efficient investigation of the cause of accident was made. Patten v. Standard Oil Co. of
Louisiana, - Tenn. -, 55 S. W. (2d) 759 (1933).
LEO FREEDMAN.
SALE OF AIRCRAFT-WAIVER OF DEFAULT BY SELLER-NECESSITY OF NOTICE

BEFORE FORFEITURE.-[Utah]

This was an action to recover possession of

and title to an airplane. Peck, the vendor of two airplanes sold to Brenner and Luke, partners, agreed with the latter that a balance of $975 owing
him on the purchase price of the first plane be considered as part of the
purchase price of the new plane. Accordingly, the partners signed a titleretaining note on the new plane for the amount of this unpaid balance. No
payments were made on the due dates specified. Peck then assigned his
note to the defendant, Stevens, who was employed by the plaintiff corporation, which was the assignee of the partnership. Subsequently the defendant, having completed his day's work, took the plane to the hangar of a
different company and then for the first time, without notice or demand
on the plaintiff, notified the plaintiff that he held the note. The plaintiff
tendered the amount of the note plus interest but this tender was refused
by the defendant because it did not include his wages. The defendant contended that he rightfully repossessed the plane because of the default. The
plaintiff's position was that Peck, by accepting payments on the note after
the due date thereof, thereby waived strict performance of the contract,
and that neither he nor his assignee, Stevens, could thereafter lawfully repossess the plane without first giving the plaintiff notice and a reasonable
opportunity to pay the balance due, and that further, when the full amount
due on the note was tendered, the plaintiff became the owner and entitled
to possession of the plane. Held, judgment for plaintiff. Peck's conduct
sufficiently showed an intention to waive the strict performance of the contract and to receive further payments. Peck had waived the default; consequently he must give notice and an opportunity for payment before a
forfeiture and repossession could be claimed. Therefore, when the defendant, as assignee of Peck, took possession of the plane he did so wrong-
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fully, so that when tender was made of the whole amount due, the plaintiff
became entitled to the possession of and title to the plane. Columbia Airways, Inc. v. Stevens, 14 P. (2d) 984 (Utah, 1932).
DAVID AXELROD.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT.-[New York] Decedent, an airplane pilot, was killed in Connecticut while piloting a plane
from Boston, Massachusetts, to Newark, New Jersey. The contract of
employment was made in New York City in the main office of the employer,
a Connecticut corporation. The State Industrial Board decided that decedent's place of employment was in the State of New York, and awarded
plaintiff compensation under the New York Workmen's Compensation Law.
This award was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court,
and upon appeal to the Court of Appeals was affirmed without an opinion.
Tallman v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc. et al., 259 N. Y. 512 (1932).
LEO FREEDMAN.
WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION-SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT-INJURY

RESULTING

FROM PROHIBITED ACROBATIC FLYING.-[Wisconsin] A pilot who carried passengers on short observation flights, was killed when his plane, in which
he was carrying two passengers failed to right itself after entering upon a
power dive. The Industrial Commission awarded compensation to the wife
of the deceased. The case was appealed to the Circuit Court which reversed the finding of the Industrial Commission and held that the deceased
had stepped out of the course of his employment by making the dive and
that therefore his widow was not entitled to compensation. The Industrial
Commission appealed to the Supreme Court. The award of compensation
was resisted by the defendant employer on three grounds: (1) the defendant was not subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act because it
did not have three persons in its employ within the meaning of the Act;
(2) the deceased was not engaged in performing services growing out of
and incidental to his employment at the time of the accident; (3) the jurisdiction over the subject-matter of this action was vested in the Federal
Government exclusively, and the industrial Commission had no jurisdiction
over it. It appeared that at various times from three to five persons were
employed by the defendant in moving, preparing and piloting the planes.
Held: reversed and remanded. The defendant was within the provisions
of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Circuit Court erred in making
a finding of fact when there was a conflict in the inferences or presumptions that could be drawn from the evidence on that subject; such finding
should have been made by the Industrial Commission. The state Workmen's Compensation Act is applicable to employees and employers who are
engaged in intrastate aircraft navigation: Sheboygan Airways v. Industrial
Commission 245 N. W. 178 (1932).
For a note on the merits of this case see 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 464.
WESLEY F. HANNER.

